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THE REAL ESTATE BROKER'S RIGHT TO A
COMMISSION UPON THE PROCUREMENT
OF A PURCHASER READY, WILLING,
AND ABLE TO PURCHASE
INTRODUCTION
THE PRESENTATION of the subject matter hereof will be made inthe following manner: General Rule; Analysis of the Concept
of Ready, Willing, and Able Purchaser; the Right to a Commis-
sion Without Procuring a Ready, Willing, and Able Purchaser;
and the Right to a Commision Upon Procuring a Ready, Willing,
and Able Purchaser When the Brokerage Contract Contains Con-
ditional Requirements.
GENERAL RULE
The general rule is that one employed to sell or exchange or
to find a buyer for real estate has earned his commission when he
has procured a party ready, willing, and able to consummate the
transaction contemplated in his contract of employment.' The lead-
ing Illinois case of Monroe v. Snow 2 states the rule as follows:
Appellant contends, that inasmuch as he refused to ratify
the contract of sale, and the purchaser could not have it speci-
fically performed for want of written authority to the plaintiffs
to make the sale, he is not bound to pay the plaintiffs anything
for their services. We can not lend our sanction to this view of the
law. A real estate broker employed to make sale of land, who finds
a purchaser at the price fixed by the owner,-who is ready, able and
willing to take a conveyance and pay the purchase price, has
earned the compensation agreed to be paid him; or if the com-
pensation is not fixed by the parties, he will be entitled to "recover
the usual and customary reasonable compensation for the service
performed 8
At least one author indicates that there is authority holding
that the broker earns his commission only if he succeeds in getting
1 Monroe v. Snow, 131 Ill. 126, 23 N.E. 401 (1890) (sell); Purgett v. Weinrank, 219
Ill. App. 28 (2d Dist. 1920); Caruthers v. Reesor, 134 Ill. App. 370 (3d Dist. 1907) (sell);
Schulte v. Meehan, 133 Ill. App. 491 (1st Dist. 1907) (exchange); Oldham v. Howser, 125
I11. App. 543 (3d Dist. 1906) (find a purchaser); Hanrahan v. Ulrich, 107 I1. App. 626
(Ist Dist. 1903) (exchange); Hersher v. Wells, 103 I11. App. 418 (4th Dist. 1902) (sell or
trade).
2 131 Ill. 126, 23 N.E. 401 (1890).
3 Id. at 136, 23 N.E. at 402-3.
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the purchaser to sign a binding contract.4 The alleged conflict is
based on the distinction between the statement of the general
rule in Monroe v. Snow5 and the following statement from Wilson
v. Mason.6
Some of the cases go so far as to hold, that the broker is not
entitled to his commissions unless the sale is actually accomplished
by the delivery of the deed of the land from vendor to the vendee
and the payment of the purchase money by the latter, or unless it
is proven that the sale is prevented by the fault of the vendor.
Other cases seem to hold, that the broker is entitled to his com-
missions when the minds of the vendor and purchaser meet in a
verbal agreement for the sale by the one and the purchase by the
other of the land. We are not inclined to follow either of these
classes of cases, regarding them as extreme and exceptional. The
true rule is, that the broker is entitled to his commissions, if the
purchaser presented by him and the vendor, his employer, enter
into a valid, binding and enforceable contract. If, after the making
of such a contract, even though executory in form, the purchaser
declines to complete the sale and the seller refuses to compel
performance, the broker ought not to be deprived of his commis-
sions. He has done all that he can do when he produces a party
who is able, and, in binding form, offers to purchase upon the
proposed terms. An agreement by a real estate broker to procure
a purchaser not only implies that the purchaser shall be one able
to comply, but that the seller and the purchaser must be bound
to each other in a valid contract. So, where the agreement of the
real estate broker is to make a sale, his commission is earned
when a contract is entered into which is mutually obligatory upon
the vendor and vendee, even though the vendee afterwards refuses
to execute his part of the contract of sale or purchase. 7 (Emphasis
added.)
It is believed, however, that the cases are not really in conflict,
and that the Wilson case can be distinguished by careful analysis.
The statement of the general rule in the Monroe case was
made in affirming the instructions given by the trial court that the
jury must find that the brokers procured a purchaser ready, wil-
4 Anderson, Real Estate Brokers' Commissions 76 (1948). The author states:
There are several questions of brokers' commission on which there are cases
in this State expressing opposite views. Take such a simple question as to
whether or not a broker has earned his commission when he has found a buyer
who is ready, willing, and able to buy, or when he has brought about a valid
enforcement contract. . . . (The author then quotes from Wilson v. Mason and
Monroe v. Snow.)
The case of Hasher (sic) v. Wells, 103 Ill. App. 418 and Jenkins v. Hollings-
worth, 83 Ill. App. 139, distinguishes these two cases, but it seems to me that
they express different points of view.
Supra note 2 and accompanying text.
6 158 Ill. 304, 42 N.E. 134 (1895).
7 Id. at 310-11, 42 N.E. at 136.
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ling, and able to purchase on the terms in the brokerage contract
before they will be entitled to their commission. Therefore, there
can be no doubt that this decision expressed a positive rule of law
regarding the performance required of a broker.
The Wilson case, however, involved a contract to purchase
land by two executors, signed by only one without the written au-
thority of the other, with no evidence showing that they had any
power under the will to purchase land for the estate.
The broker alleged that the agreement was that he only had
to "procure" a purchaser, and the principal contended that the
agreement was to pay a commission when the purchaser "took and
paid for" the property. The trial and appellate courts had decided
this factual dispute in favor of the principal, and their decisions
were accepted by the court.
The court held that since the brokerage agreement, in effect,
required the consummation of a sale then the broker would not
be permitted to recover under the above principal of law because
the contract between the broker and the executor had been aban-
doned by the executor and was unenforceable due to the executor's
lack of authority; thus, no sale had been consummated. Essentially
this holding was simply that where the condition that the property
be "took and paid for," is required, the mere procurement of a
ready, willing, and able buyer without an enforceable contract
for sale is not sufficient performance of the brokerage contract.'
8 See Fox v. Ryan, 240 Ill. 391, 88 N.E. 974 (1909), which follows and endorses this
principle of law by quoting the language in the Wilson case. The broker therein was
required to "effect a sale" under the terms of the brokerage contract. (It is ironical that
the confusion in this area of law was caused by the Wilson case because it involved the
sale of the "Real Estate Board Building" in Chicago.)
The Supreme Court, in Lawrence v. Rhodes, 188 Ill. 96, 58 N.E. 910 (1900), contri-
buted to the confusion caused in Wilson. In that case the court denied the broker a
commission because the sale was not "effected" as required by the brokerage contract.
The court distinguished the Wilson case by saying that the broker therein was not re-
quired to "effect" a sale; in fact, the court could have used the Wilson case to support its
decision.
The Illinois appellate courts however, have survived the confusing language of the
Wilson case. In most cases in which it is cited as authority for their decisions, a condi-
tion precedent of consummation is present. Dahlgard v. Florida Development Corp., 187
Ill. App. 282 (1st Dist. 1914) (commission denied where the purchaser procured was a
corporation attempting an ultravires act-therefore, the purchaser had no legal ability
to purchase; also, consummation of the sale was a condition precedent); cf., Packer v.
Sheppard, 127 Ill. App. 598 (1st Dist. 1906) (commission granted where the broker pro-
duced a ready, willing, and able purchaser and the contract of sale recited an option to
forfeit in the principal which he exercised by not enforcing the contract claiming that
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The court also held, however, that regardless of what type of
performance the brokerage agreement required, the broker had
not earned his commission because the executor was legally in-
capable of entering into a binding contract to purchase land for
the estate.9 It is submitted that this holding is within the concept
of a "ready, willing, and able" purchaser regardless of the added
criteria (quoted above) utilized by the court to explain the dis-
position of this case, if the brokerage agreement required a con-
summated sale as a prerequisite to the earning of a commission.
The court clearly stated the general rule on the first page of its
opinion as follows: "The duty of a broker, who is employed to
sell real estate, is to find and produce to the vendor a purchaser,
who is ready, willing, and able to complete the purchase as pro-
posed. This he must do before he is entitled to any commissions.' 10
Therefore, it is submitted that the Supreme Court has not devi-
ated from the general rule expressed in the Monroe case.
Not only have the appellate courts distinguished the above
quote from the Wilson case from the general rule," but the Su-
preme Court has cited the Wilson case as authority for the general
rule expressed in the Monroe case. 12 It is submitted that the gen-
eral rule has been applied consistently in Illinois, even in those
decisions not specifically stating the rule.
In all cases, where the broker alleges that he has earned a
the purchaser was financially unable to purchase; thus the transaction was not consum-
mated due to the fault of the principal.)
9 In the next section of this article, all cases wherein the courts have denied com-
missions because the purchaser has been legally incapable of entering into a binding
real estate contract will be classified as cases involving an "unready" purchaser for the
sake of convenience.
10 158 Ill. at 309, 42 N.E. at 135.
11 Schulte v. Meehan, 133 111. App. 491 (1st Dist. 1907) (Wilson case distinguished);
Carter v. Simpson, 130 Ill. App. 328 (3d Dist. 1906) (general rule distinguished); Fox v.
Starr, 106 Ill. App. 273 (2d Dist. 1902) (general rule distinguished); Hersher v. Wells, 103
Il. App. 418 (4th Dist. 1902) (Wilson case distinguished); Jenkins v. Hollingsworth &
Tabor, 83 Ill. App. 139 (3d Dist. 1898) (general rule distinguished).
12 In Oliver v. Sattler, 233 I11. 536, 84 N.E. 652 (1908), where the brokers secured a
purchaser under a contract containing terms which did not comply with the authority
given the brokers under their brokerage contract, the Supreme Court made the following
statement: "It was incumbent on them [the brokers] to show that the purchaser was
ready, willing, and able to perform the contract and that it was in accordance with the
authority given and the terms prescribed. (Wilson v. Mason, 158 11. 304)." Id. at 540, 84
N.E. at 654. This case held, via the "general rule," that the broker is not entitled to a
commission unless he produces a purchaser who is ready, willing, and able to comply
with the terms specified in the brokerage contract.
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commission, the court must first construe the terms of the bro-
kerage contract to determine whether the ready, willing, and able
test can be applied or whether a condition precedent must be ful-
filled before the broker is entitled to his commission. This is not
always an easy task. A vivid recent example of a case construing
the terms of a brokerage contract and deciding whether the broker
had produced a ready, willing, and able buyer is Levit v. Bowers.1 3
In that case, the brokerage contract required the broker to "suc-
cessfully negotiate a sale." The court, after considerable discussion,
held that "[t]he word 'successfully' was not used in that case but,
as we interpret it, the word 'successfully' as used in connection
with 'negotiate' in the instant case meant negotiations which
would end in an offer that met all the terms imposed by the
seller."' 4 The commission was granted since the negotiations of
the broker ended in an offer by the purchaser which was accepted
by the principal even though a contract of sale was never con-
summated.
Assuming the broker has found a ready, willing, and able
purchaser, he must give notice of this fact to his principal before
his authority to act expires or is revoked in good faith.15 If the
broker has found a ready, willing, and able buyer and given notice
to his principal, the principal's refusal to enter into a contract
or release of the purchaser from the contract will not deprive the
broker of his commission, provided his employment contract did
not require the consummation of a sale.' 6
ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF READY, WILLING, AND
ABLE PURCHASER
The courts rarely discuss the concept of ready, willing, and
able in its separate facets, except in cases involving the financial
ability of the purchaser. 7 However, for the sake of convenience,
this author will discuss each of the three facets separately. While
Is 2 Ill. App. 2d 343, 119 N.E.2d 536 (1st Dist. 1954).
14 Id. at 349, 119 N.E.2d at 539.
15 See Mechem, Outlines Agency § 563 (4th ed. 1952).
16 Swigart v. Hawley, 140 Ill. 186, 29 N.D. 883 (1894) (dicta on refusal); Goldstein v.
Rosenberg, 331 Ill. App. 347, 73 N.E.2d 168 (1st Dist. 1947) (refusal and sale to another);
and Packer v. Sheppard, 127 Ill. App. 598 (1st Dist. 1906) (release).
17 In these cases "able" is defined as "financially able." See Kratovil, Real Estate Law
91 (4th ed. 1964).
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this method is novel (to the best of author's knowledge), it pro-
vides a simple means of attacking a highly complex organizational
problem. Also, it is submitted that such a method of categorization
as will be utilized herein, will lead to an easy and more thorough
understanding of what the courts really mean in a particular case
where the phrase "ready, willing, and able" is used to support
the holding.
Generally
Certain principles apply to the entire concept of ready,
willing, and able, and are worthy of discussion. For instance, a
principal is not obligated to accept a purchaser procured by the
broker without an opportunity to investigate his ability (both
legal and financial) to comply with the terms required by the
brokerage contract.' But where such an opportunity has been
had or waived by the manifestation of approval by the principal,
then the principal cannot deny the broker his commission on the
ground that the purchaser was not ready, willing, and able.19 This
latter point will be more thoroughly discussed under later sections
of this article.20
In order to be entitled to his commission, a broker must al-
ways procure a purchaser who is ready, willing, and able according
to the terms of the brokerage contract.21
The burden of proving that the purchaser is ready, willing,
and able is upon the broker.22 One case states via dicta that the
burden of proof is still on the broker even after the principal
accepts and enters into an agreement with the purchaser. 23 It
18 Greenwald v. Marcus, 3 Ill. App. 2d 495, 123 N.E.2d 139 (st Dist. 1954); Smith,
Adm'r v. Penn, 151 Ill. App. 155 (3d Dist. 1909).
19 Greenwald v. Marcus, supra note 18; Mechem, The Real Estate Broker and His
Commission, 6 Il1. L. Rev. 149 (1911).
20 See text accompanying notes 50 & 55 and Greenwald v. Marcus; 3 Ill. App. 2d 495,
123 N.E.2d 139 (lst Dist. 1954).
21 Oliver v. Sattler, 233 Ill. 536, 84 N.E. 652 (1908). The broker must act strictly
according to the authority conferred upon him by the brokerage contract. Hoyt v.
Shepard, 70 111. 509 (1873).
22 Fox v. Ryan, 240 Ill. 391, 88 N.E. 974 (1909). The broker must prove that the
prospective purchaser was ready, willing, and able to accept the terms proposed. Accord,
Oliver v. Sattler, supra note 21; Greenwald v. Marcus, supra note 18; Smith, Adm'r v.
Penn, supra note 18; Pratt v. Hotchkiss, 10 Ill. App. 603 (1st Dist. 1882).
28 Hersher v. Wells, 103 Ill. App. 418 (4th Dist. 1902). It is submitted that the court
has made a highly enlightened observation via this dicta in its excellent decision, which
isolates the "readiness" of the purchaser to perform an exchange where he is "willing"
and "able," but has not proven title. See text at note 33, infra.
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will be pointed out in a separate section of this article that this is
not always true. Most cases hold that it is not necessary for the
purchaser to be ready, wiling, and able if the principal has con-
tracted with and accepted the purchaser.24 If the terms of the
contract specifically require the broker to prove that the pur-
chaser is ready, willing, and able, then the broker must sustain
that burden even where the principal has contracted with the
purchaser.2 5
A "Ready" Purchaser
Under the organizational system herein, a "ready" purchaser
will be defined as one who has the legal power or legal capability
to perform under the terms of the brokerage contract. The types
of cases in this area have only one thing in common-the question
of whether or not the purchaser is legally capable of performing
the contract of sale. Therefore, it will not be possible to point out
all of the varied situations where the question arises (not because
of the lack of space, but simply because the author has not ex-
hausted his imagination in this area).
The leading case in this area is Wilson v. Mason,26 where the
broker, under a contract to consummate a sale, procured a pur-
chaser who lacked the legal authority under a will to purchase
the property as a co-executor, and also lacked legal authority to
consummate a sale since he acted without the written consent of
his co-executor. As a result of this legal inability, the contract
was unenforceable, and the broker was denied his commission.
In a case where the broker was only required to procure
a sale or exchange, instead of consummating a sale, the court made
a strikingly similar holding by using the Wilson case as authority.2 7
24 Rasar & Johnson v. Spurling, 176 Ill. App. 349 (3d Dist. 1912), held it was not
necessary that the purchaser be ready, willing and able to purchase at terms originally
agreed upon by the vendor and broker, and if the vendor sold on new terms the broker
was entitled to commission.
In Glatt v. Adams, 226 Ill. App. 321 (1st Dist. 1922), the court held that where the
principal had accepted his wife as a purchaser, no question could thereafter arise regard-
ing whether or not the wife was ready, willing, and able to purchase. See text accom-
panying note 55 infra.
25 Husak v. Maywald, 185 Ill. App. 479 (1st Dist. 1914). Such a requirement is a
condition precedent to the recovery of a commission.
26 158 Ill. 304, 42 N.E. 134 (1895).
27 Dinginan v. Boyle, 209 Ill. App. 311 (1st Dist. 1918), aff'd, 285 IlL. 144, 120 N.E.
487 (1918).
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In that case, the purchasers procured by the broker lacked the le-
gal authority to purchase the property because although one of
them had the authority to act as a trustee in case of a vacancy, it
was not affirmatively proven that a vacancy actually had occurred.
In Dahigard v. Florida,28 the commission was denied because
the purchaser procured by the broker under a contract to consum-
mate a sale was a corporation attempting an ultra-vires act. Thus,
the purchaser was legally incapable of performing under the terms
of the brokerage contract.
The excellent decision of Hersher v. Wells,9 portrays a situa-
tion where the court held that a broker under a contract to procure
a sale or trade, not to consummate the sale, produced a purchaser
who was "willing" under the terms of the contract, and financially
"able," but "not ready" to trade because the broker failed to prove
that the purchaser had legal title. In stressing this point in the
very last sentence of the opinion, the court said: "There is no
evidence in the record which even remotely tends to show that
the purchasers were able (legally capable or "ready") to convey
title to the lands involved in the exchange.8 0
In Davis v. Pauler,3 the court rejected the Hersher dictum
suggesting that the burden of proving ready, willing, and able is
still on the broker even after the principal accepts and enters into
an agreement with the purchaser. 2 In this case, the broker was
required under his employment contract to negotiate (procure)
a trade. The broker, with express or imputed knowledge of the
title status, produced a purchaser who was legally incapable of
passing a good title to the property, and the principal accepted the
contract. The court held that the broker was entitled to his com-
mission even though the purchaser was not legally capable, because
the principal accepted the purchaser."
It is submitted that the result reached under the holding in
28 187 Ili. App. 282 (1st Dist. 1914).
29 103 Ill. App. 418 (4th Dist. 1902).
80 Id. at 422-23.
31 170 Ill. App. 317 (1st Dist. 1912). Contra, Lucas v. Schwartz, 243 Ill. App. 418 (1st
Dist. 1927).
32 See note 22 and accompanying text.
83 It should be noted for the sake of continuing clarification of the "ready, willing
and able concept" that the purchaser in this case was both "willing" and financially
"able."
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this case is less desirable (from the standpoint of justice) than it
would have been if the suggestion in the Hersher case had been
followed. This contract of sale does not fulfill the prerequisites
of being valid and enforceable as do the contracts in the other
cases (involving "willing" and "able") in which the court has
granted recovery because the principal accepted the purchaser.3 4
Also, the broker is more culpable when he produces the "unready"
purchaser than is the principal who has hired the broker. It is the
broker's job to investigate and produce a "ready" purchaser; the
principal has promised to pay him for doing his job in a thorough
manner. The broker has been hired as an expert in real estate
transactions and has a duty to act accordingly.
The last "failure of title" case, Jenkins v. Hollingworth &
Tabor,3 involved a brokerage contract requiring the consumma-
tion of a trade, and the purchaser in the trade admittedly did not
have legal title to the property. The broker was not permitted
to recover for the dual reasons that he did not meet the condition
precedent of consummation, and he was not legally capable or
"ready." It is earnestly submitted that this decision is in complete
accord in legal principle with the Wilson and Dahlgard cases dis-
cussed previously in this section."
On the other hand, it has been held that the purchaser pro-
duced by the broker is "ready" even if the contract between the
principal and the purchaser is voidable under the Statute of
Frauds, providing that the purchaser produced is otherwise ready,
willing, and able. This rule is fair because the broker is only
required to produce a ready, willing, and able purchaser in all
34 See discussion in text after note 61 infra.
35 83 Ill. App. 139 (3d Dist. 1898).
86 It is further submitted that some authors have been completely misled, as indi-
cated in the quote in note 4 supra which suggests that the legal principles applied in
Wilson and Jenkins can be distinguished.
37 Carter v. Simpson, 130 Ill. App. 328 (3d Dist. 1906). In Fox v. Starr, 106 Ill. App.
273 (2d Dist. 1902), the court made the following statement:
When a real estate agent makes a verbal contract for the sale of land, void
under the statute of frauds, and which his principal refuses to carry out, the
agent is nevertheless entitled to his commissions, upon showing that the pro-
spective purchaser was able, ready, and willing to comply with his contract ...
Nor is it necessary, between the vendor and his agent, that the latter's authority
to sell should be in writing, but the rule goes no further .... A real estate agent
or broker, though only verbally authorized to make a sale of real estate, is en-
titled to commissions, upon proof of a verbal contract to sell the same upon the
terms and conditions given him by his principal, if the prospective purchaser is
one ready, willing, and able to consummate the purchase. Id. at 274-275.
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cases. After this requirement has been fulfilled, the principal will
be more culpable if the contract comes under the Statute of Frauds
because the broker no longer has any requirements to perform
under the terms of his brokerage contract. It would seem that
the same result would be reached where the purchaser produced
is a minor, since his contract also would be voidable. However,
the author has failed to locate any cases on this point.
A "Willing" Purchaser
Under the analytical system used in this article for organiza-
tional purposes, a "willing" purchaser is one who immediately de-
sires to purchase on the terms specified by the principal. The most
common problems arising in this area concern a determination of
what the principal's terms are and whether the broker's prospect
was willing to buy on those terms.
As to this problem, there is a paucity of appellate decisions.
This is understandable since it is obvious to the broker who fails
to produce a purchaser presently desiring to enter into a contract
with the seller on the terms specified that he has not earned his
commission. However, one illustrative case is Close v. Browne.8s
In that case the .broker argued that a real estate broker is entitled
to his commission if the principal sells to a purchaser produced
by him even though the sale is made on terms different from those
stated in the brokerage contract. The court rejected his contention
and stated:
Such is the law applicable to cases where there is merely a
departure from the terms of the contract, leaving the transaction
substantially that provided for by the agreement, such as a re-
duction in the price asked or an extension of the time payment
of all or part of the consideration; but where the transaction
is wholly different from the one contemplated by the parties
when the contract was made there can be no recovery upon the
contract. In this class of contracts it may be fairly presumed that
the parties contemplate some slight modification in the terms of
the sale, provided the principal assents to such modification; but
it cannot be presumed that the parties intend that the contract
shall apply to a transaction wholly different from the one which
they have in view when they enter into the contract.3 9
While appellate cases are not frequent, one distinguished au-
8 230 Ill. 228, 82 N.E. 629 (1907).
89 Id. at 241, 82 N.E. at 633.
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thor has warned that where a principal is dissatisfied with the
purchaser procured by the broker, he will often seek to take refuge
behind the rule that if the purchaser is not "ready" according to
the terms of the brokerage contract, the broker is not entitled to
his commission. He states:
This is obvious where the broker's prospect offers less than
the seller's listing price, or offers to buy on an installment con-
tract where the seller's listing contemplates a cash deal. But in
addition, keep in mind that if the broker's listing contract is silent
on other terms of the transaction, the law will read various impli-
cations into it, just as courts read various implications into a
contract of sale that is silent. . . . And if the terms of sale as set
forth in the contract of sale do not harmonize with the terms of
sale set forth or implied in the listing contract, the seller may
reject the broker's prospect without incurring any liability for
commission.41
Thus in Migneault v. Gunther,?2 the court denied the com-
mission by holding that the prospect for a ninety-nine year lease
was not "ready" to perform the implied term in the brokerage
contract that the lease include a "condemnation clause." The only
term expressly required by the brokerage contract in this case was
the amount of the rent.
Now that the reader has a fair idea of how the courts construe
the term "willing" via desire of the purchaser to comply with the
seller's terms, the requirement of the immediacy of the purchaser's
desire will be explored. This aspect of whether a purchaser is
"willing" or not only reaches the appellate courts in option cases.
The general rule in Illinois is that a broker employed to sell
real estate and to find a purchaser for his principal is not entitled
to a commission where he merely procures a purchaser of an
option which is not exercised.43 This rule has been applied con-
40 Kratovil, Real Estate Law 92-93 (4th ed. 1964).
41 Ibid. The two examples of implied terms given by Mr. Kratovil are: (1) The
brokerage contract is silent on question of abstract or other evidence of title-if the sale
contract prepared by the broker requires the seller to furnish evidence of title, the broker
has not procured a "ready" purchaser under the brokerage contract. (2) If the brokerage
contract is silent as to what will be included in the sale, the principal will only be required
to sell the real estate and fixtures-if the contract of sale requires the principal to sell
personal property such as furniture, then the purchaser procured is not a "ready" pur-
chaser. Ibid.
42 171 Ill. App. 311 (lst Dist. 1912).
43 Lawrence v. Rhodes, 188 Ill. 96, 58 N.E. 910 (1900); Mason v. Miller, 179 Ill. App.
347 (2d Dist. 1913); Keach v. Bunn, 116 Ill. App. 397 (3d Dist. 1904), afl'd, 214 Ill. 259, 73
N.E. 419 (1905).
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sistently. The decisions are based on the reasoning that the
broker, under the terms of his employment contract to find a
purchaser or sell, is required to produce a purchaser "willing"
to purchase at the present time, and not one who may never pur-
chase at all."
Apparently, there is no authority in Illinois involving a situa-
tion where the purchaser procured by the broker subsequently
exercises the option. However, the United States Supreme Court
has held that the broker is entitled to his commission in such a
situation because the purchase was made as a proximate cause of
the broker's efforts. 45 Thus, the Court seems to consider the pur-
chaser "willing" pro tanto when he exercises the option. One case
indicates that Illinois might hold the other way, but this case can
be distinguished by the fact that the court held the option was
exercised on materially different terms than those required by the
brokerage contract.4 6
In Fox v. Ryan,47 the court held that a contract of sale pro-
viding for a down payment with the other payments "strung along
sixty, ninety days, six months to a year" was not an option. The
court stated that this was an enforceable contract, and when the
principal (after accepting the purchaser's offer) failed to enforce
it upon forfeiture of the down payment, he was liable for the
commission.
Of course, if the option to forfeit is in the principal, and he
exercises it, the courts will permit the broker to recover his com-
mission upon his showing that he had procured a ready, willing,
and able purchaser.48
An "Able" Purchaser
At first blush, the "able" purchaser is the easiest facet of
the concept of "ready, willing, and able" to understand. Just
as with the Rule against Perpetuities, the rule is simple; the
application, however, reminds one of Justice Holme's statement
that "Life consists of drawing the line." The broker is entitled to
44 Ibid.
45 Campbell v. Rawlings, 280 Fed. 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1922). This appears to be the pre-
vailing view. See generally Annot., 23 A.L.R. 856, 859-60 (1923).
46 Murawska v. Boeger, 219 Ill. App. 241 (1st Dist. 1920).
47 146 Il. App. 245 (1st Dist. 1909), af'd, 240 Ill. 391, 88 N.E. 974 (1909).
48 Packer v. Sheppard, 127 ill. App. 598 (1st Dist. 1906).
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a commission when he produces a purchaser who is financially
able to perform according to the terms of the brokerage contract.4 a
The questions are-what are the terms of the brokerage contract
and when is the purchaser considered financially able to perform
under them.
The usual dispute over what the price terms in the brokerage
contract actually are is purely factual in nature, and thus settled
in the trial court, usually after a great deal of controversy.
In order to meet the "able" portion of the test, it is the bro-
ker's burden to show that his purchaser was able to "command,"
in his own name, the funds necessary to perform the offer.4 9 Ep-
stein v. Howard" held that "to command funds" refers to the
purchaser's own ability; it must not be necessary for him to depend
upon a third person who is not bound to furnish the money, and
over whom the purchaser has no control.
Thus, in the Epstein case, the broker, in view of the lower
court's finding that the purchaser produced was not financially
able himself, vigorously contended that the purchaser was acting
for an undisclosed principal. The court countered with the propo-
sition above and denied him a commission. Similarly, in Smith,
Adm's v. Penn,5 the broker was denied a commission due to the
fact that the purchaser was financially unable to provide more
than the earnest money.
A purchaser may be considered financially "able" even if he
has to borrow the necessary funds, but it is generally held that
where the purchaser has promised to procure a loan, the broker
will be denied his commission if it is not procured within the
48a Lawrence v. Rhodes, 188 Ill. 96, 58 N.E. 910 (1900): Smith, Adm'r v. Penn, 161
Ill. App. 155 (3d Dist. 1909); Marcy v. Whallon, 115 111. App. 435 (2d Dist. 1904). One dis-
tinguished Illinois author sums up this area by saying, "The buyer must be able to com-
mand the necessary funds to close the deal within the time required ..... He must actually
have the money to meet any such payments required and be in shape financially to meet
any deferred payments." Kratovil, Real Estate Law 91 (4th ed. 1964).
49 Epstein v. Howard, 5 Ill. App. 2d 553, 126 N.E.2d 153 (Ist Dist. 1955); William C.
Bender and Co. v. Tritz, 338 Ill. App. 661, 88 N.E.2d 519 (1st Dist. 1949) (second mortgage
committment and cash surrender value of life insurance policies did not show command
over necessary funds).
50 Ibid.
51 Supra at note 48.
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time prescribed by the agreement, or if it is unlikely to be made
at all.52
RIGHT TO A COMMISSION WITHOUT PROCURING A READY,
WILLING, AND ABLE PURCHASER
There are certain situations where the broker apparently is
not required to produce a ready, willing, and able purchaser. One
example is where the broker has an "exclusive listing" or an "ex-
clusive right to sell," and these employment contracts are violated
by the principal. The first article of this symposium discusses the
broker's rights under exclusive contracts. Also, the area of bad
faith on the part of the principal is more appropriately discussed
in the other articles of the symposium.
Illinois courts have sometimes permitted the broker a quan-
tum meruit recovery where he fails to produce a ready, willing,
and able purchaser, but has performed time consuming labor in
connection with a transaction which was ultimately consummated. 58
There is a line of cases in Illinois which has permitted the
broker to recover his commission where the broker has not pro-
duced a ready, willing, and able purchaser, but the principal has
accepted the purchaser by entering into an agreement with him.
The reason for this is that:
[W]here the principal actually consummates the particular
transaction with the person produced by the broker or enters a
contract with him, the question of the ability, readiness, and wil-
lingness of such person is no longer material. In such a case the
principal accepts the customer as ready, able, and willing, and
e is estopped from denying the purchaser's ability or willingness
to complete the contract, inasmuch as he is not bound to accept
the offer of such person without a reasonable opportunity to in-
quire and satisfy himself in relation to it.54
This rule is stated via dicta in Carr v. Butterworth55 as fol-
lows:
The law in this State is well settled that where an owner lists
his real estate with a broker for sale, the broker has earned his
52 Cooper v. Liberty National Bank Of Chicago, 332 I11. App. 459, 75 N.E.2d 769
(1st Dist. 1947) (purchaser failed to procure a loan within a specified period as agreed);
Adams v. Hall, 168 Ill. App. 569 (1st Dist. 1912) (borrowing money on a second mortgage
on the premises sold held not likely to be successful).
53 Close v. Browne, 230 Ill. 228, 82 N.E. 629 (1907).
54 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Brokers § 183 (1964).
55 219 Ill. App. 14, 18 (2d Dist. 1920). The vast majority of cases expressly held that
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commission (1) where the broker has procured a prospective pur-
chaser, who is able, ready and willing to enter into a contract for
purchase on the owner's terms and the owner refuses to enter into
such contract, or (2) the broker produces a prospective pur-
chaser, whom the owner, without fraud on the part of the broker,
accepts, and with whom the owner enters into a valid, binding,
enforceable contract for sale, and in the latter case it is immaterial
whether the contract is carried out or fails to be carried out by
the reason of the default of the prospective purchaser. (Emphasis
added.)
In Davis v. Pauler,5 6 the purchaser was not "ready" to per-
form because he lacked a good title in a real estate exchange trans-
action. The court held that the broker could recover and stated
that the principal had accepted the purchaser by entering into a
contract with him even though it was not enforceable due to lack
of mutuality. An earlier court in another district would have held
the other way according to its dicta.57
In another case, Rushkiewicz v. St. George,"8 the purchaser
produced was not financially "able" to purchase. The court held
that the broker could nevertheless recover his commission because
the principal had accepted by entering into an enforceable con-
a commission can only be recovered where the contract entered into between the princi-
pal and the purchaser is valid and enforceable. Fox v. Ryan, 240, Il. 391, 88 N.E. 974
(1909) (commission granted; contract was enforceable in this case and the principal chose
not to enforce it); Wilson v. Mason, 158 I1. 304, 42 N.E. 134 (1895) (commission denied
where the contract was not valid and enforceable); Bowers v. Hoffman, 225 11. App, 35
(1st Dist. 1929) (rule acknowledged and accepted, but contract was not enforceable here,
and the commission was denied due to the misrepresentations (fault) of the broker; thus
this case can be distinguished); Newman v. Lunley, 125 111. App. 382 (2d Dist. 1906)
(commission granted where principal accepted purchaser but failed to enforce contract;
court did not require the broker to prove the purchaser's ability to pay); Lawrence v.
Rhodes, 87 I11. App. 672 (1st Dist. 1899) (commission granted where contract was held
enforceable in a court of law for damages only, not in equity for specific performance;
the court held that the commission should be granted where the purchaser was accepted
by the principal, but then permitted to walk out on the deal after returning the earnest
money to the principal. On these facts, the court indicated that recovery could be had
even though the contract might have lacked mutuality).
Under the general rule of Monroe v. Snow, 131 Ill. 126, 23 N.E. 401 (1890), the
broker may be entitled to his commission though the principal and purchaser enter into
an unenforceable agreement if the purchaser is ready, willing and able. Ward v. Law-
rence, 79 Ill. 295 (1875); Goodmanson v. Rosenstein, 144 Ill. App. 243 (2d Dist. 1908);
Carter v. Simpson, 130 Ill. App. 328 (3d Dist. 1906).
56 170 I1. App. 317 (1st Dist. 1912). It is submitted that this case is a radical de-
parture from the rule stated above since the contract completely lacked enforceability.
See text accompanying note 31 for author's appraisal of this case. A contra result was in
Lucas v. Schwartz, 243 Ill. App. 418 (1st Dist. 1927).
57 Hersher v. Wells, 103 I11. App. 418 (4th Dist. 1902). See note 23 and text accom-
panying note 33 for discussion of the author's appraisal of this case.
58 226 Ill. App. 310 (1st Dist. 1922). But cf., Marcy v. Whallon, 115 II. App. 435 (2d
Dist. 1904) (Principal rejected purchaser who was financially unable).
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tract. The court stated that in such a case, the principal could
not later defeat the broker's commission on the ground that the
purchaser was not able to pay the amount required.
Of course, if the broker himself is at fault in making the
contract unenforceable or objectionable to the owner, he will
not be entitled to a commission even though the owner accepts
a contract from the purchaser.6
It is submitted that all of the cases above reach fair results
with the exception of Davis v. Pauler.60 These decisions can be
understood best by examining the culpability of the parties.
Where the broker produces a "ready" purchaser who backs down
after entering into an agreement with the principal, and then the
principal refuses to enforce his valid and enforceable contract,
the broker has done everything required of him and should be
entitled to his commission.
In cases where the broker has produced a buyer who is finan-
cially unable, but the principal accepts him, it is axiomatic that
the broker has satisfied the desires of the principal regarding finan-
cial ability. Of course, if the principal rejects the broker's prospect
because of lack of his financial ability, a commission is not recov-
erable.6'
However, when the broker produces a buyer who is legally
incapable, unbeknown to both the principal and the broker, as
in the Davis case, then the broker should be considered more cul-
pable than the principal, and the broker's commission should be
denied. Also, in this situation, the contract of sale is not valid or
enforceable but void.
In those cases which are specifically decided one way or the
59 Kraus v. Campe, 328 111. App. 37, 65 N.E.2d 127 (st Dist. 1946) (commission denied
where the broker was at fault when he prepared the unenforceable contract of sale which
contained a defective legal description); Melleh v. McDermott, 211 Ill. App. 268 (1st Dist.
1918) (commission denied where contract of sale was silent as to the depository of loan
funds, and the broker's refusal to place these funds in escrow caused the seller to refuse to
go through with the deal because of the breach of an implied requirement in the con-
tract of sale to use an escrow); Quinlan v. Towle, 185 Ill. App. 592 (1st Dist. 1914) (com-
mission denied where broker had knowledge of the principal's lack of authority to sell,
caused by interest of minor heirs in property). Accord, Bowers v. Hoffman, 225 Ill. App.
35 (1st Dist. 1929); Woolf v. Sullivan, 128 Ill. App. 62 (2d Dist. 1906).
60 Supra note 56.
61 Marcy v. Whallon, supra note 58. See note 34 supra.
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other depending upon whose fault it is that the deal did not go
through, it is axiomatic that the court has reached a fair result.62
Just as in other fields of law, where the liability or exoneration
of the parties is based upon "fault," the results, if properly
reached, are always fair.6"
RIGHT TO A COMMISSION WHEN THE BROKERAGE CONTRACT
CONTAINS CONDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The preceding sections dealt with the conditions that the
broker must satisfy when the brokerage contract is silent, or when
it simply provides that the broker earns his commission if he "pro-
cures a purchaser," or "negotiates a sale."64 In such cases, the
broker earns his commission if he procures a purchaser who is
ready, willing, and able to buy on the terms specified by the owner,
and gives notice to the owner before his authority expires or is
revoked in good faith, or the principal accepts the contract from
the purchaser he has procured.
However, the principal may specify other conditions which
have to be met before the broker will be entitled to a commission.
These provisions are conditions precedent to his recovery.
The most common provision is to require a "consummation
of the Sale" as a condition to payment.6 5 Or the brokerage contract
may provide that the commission will be paid on "payment of the
purchase price," "closing of the sale," "the purchaser signing a
binding contract," or "the procuring of a purchaser who takes and
pays for the property." 6
These conditions, of course, might give the principal an op-
portunity to deny the broker a commission by simply refusing to
consummate the sale to a purchaser ready, willing, and able to
buy. For example, where a contract required the agent to perform
to the satisfaction of the principal, it has been held that such a
condition was held valid and enforceable, whether or not the
62 For examples of such cases, see note 59.
63 This proposition is so universally accepted that it needs no citation.
64 See, e.g., Levit v. Bowers, 2 Ill. App. 2d 343, 119 N.E.2d 536 (1st Dist. 1954).
65 See, e.g., Wilson v. Mason, 158 Ill. 304, 42 N.E. 134 (1895); Shotwell v. Tate, 295
Ill. App. 624, 14 N.E.2d 860 (3d Dist. 1938).
66 See, generally, 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Brokers § 192 et seq. (1964).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
agent's performance was competent and of a sort that would be
satisfactory to a reasonable principal.
However, it should be noted that the courts are quite liberal
in protecting the broker in circumstances where the principal by
his own action prevents the broker's full performance and thus
his commission. For example, in Goldstein v. Rosenberg,68 the
broker was promised a commission on the consummation of the
sale. He procured a buyer who entered into a contract to purchase.
However, the principal refused to close the deal. The court held
that under such circumstances the seller could not take advantage
of a condition precedent, the performance of which he has ren-
dered impossible.
CONCLUSION
In the area of law under discussion, the courts have done a
commendable job, indeed, in making fair decisions. It has only
been necessary to criticize the holding of the court in one case69
out of all the cases cited in this entire article. Such a discovery as
this one emphasizes the harmony of the decisions in their holding
in this complex area of law.
However, as indicated throughout this article, the courts have
not always been explicit in stating, under general categories, ex-
actly why the purchaser produced by the broker was not ready,
willing, and able, except in the area of financial ability. This
would lead one to believe that each case is decided on its own facts,
and that there are no general guidelines under which each factual
situation can be analyzed.
This author has accepted the challenge of creating appro-
priate guidelines by categorizing the various factual situations into
four separate categories: "Ready," "willing," "able," and "other
cases where it is not necessary to produce a ready, willing and able
67 Temby v. William Brunt Pottery Co., 229 Ill. 540, 82 N.E. 336 (1907).
68 331 Ill. App. 374 (1st Dist. 1947). However, in Matteson v. Walker, 249 Ill. App.
404 (1st Dist. 1928), the contract between the owner and broker provided that "if the
deal falls through and the sale is not made whatever the reason may be, Mr. Walker will
pay no commission." The court held that the broker was not entitled to a commission
where the sale was not consummated, even though he had found a buyer ready, willing,
and able to buy and the owner's refusal was arbitrary. Cf. Madden v. Brown, 169 Ill. App.
456 (1st Dist. 1912).
69 Davis v. Pauler, 170 Ill. App. 317 (1st Dist. 1912).
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purchaser." By the use of this analytical system, not expressly
adopted by the courts, the cases in this area in Illinois seem to fit
into a finite pattern which makes it easier to understand the
"real ' 70 reasons underlying each particular decision.
Most courts, unlike some of its critics,71 seem to have survived
the confusing language in the Wilson decision 72 without failing to
realize that the Supreme Court was addressing itself to a situation
involving a condition precedent, and therefore, the ready, willing,
and able test could not be applied. In order to prevent the un-
fortunate confusion by practitioners and some courts in the future,
it is respectfully suggested that the author's analytical system be
adopted by the courts for the purpose of giving the reasons under-
lying their decisions since they actually make their decisions on
the basis of this analysis anyway. This is not a request for black
and white law; 73 but rather it is a request for a system of separate
concepts upon which any factual situation raising the question
of "ready, willing, and able purchaser" can be decided for the
purpose of getting an easy and more thorough understanding of
what the courts really mean in a particular case where the phrase
"ready, willing, and able" is used to support the holding. It is
submitted that any factual situation involving this question can be
and is being decided upon the following five issues: (1) Is the
purchaser "ready," meaning is he legally capable of performing
the contract of sale? (2) Is the purchaser "willing," meaning, is
the purchaser presently desirous of complying with the expressed
or implied terms of the brokerage contract? (3) Is the purchaser
"able," meaning, is he financially able? (4) If the purchaser is not
ready, willing, and able, has the principal accepted the purchaser
by entering into a valid enforceable agreement with the purchaser
or is the principal at fault in preventing the broker from pro-
curing a ready, willing, and able purchaser? (5) If the purchaser
is ready, willing, and able does the brokerage contract require
70 It is not what the courts say, it is what they address themselves to that counts. As
one very fine professor at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Professor James K. Marshall, has
often said to his students reciting in class, "I know what the court has said, now tell me
what it is talking aboutl"
71 See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
72 Wilson v. Mason, 158 Ill. 304, 42 N.E. 134 (1895). See note 8 supra and accom-
panying text.
73 It is submitted that in the area of discussion in this article, we presently have
very few grey areas involving the actual holdings of the courts.
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more than a ready, willing, and able purchaser via a condition
precedent?
The above analytical system of the concept of ready, willing,
and able has even greater value in a case where more than one
of the above issues is involved such as in the Wilson case.
The reason that the above system is infallible is because the
"general rule" in Illinois requires the broker to produce a pur-
chaser who is ready, willing, and able in every case before he is
entitled to a commission unless the principal has accepted the
purchaser by entering into a valid and enforceable agreement
with him, or except where the principal is at fault in prevent-
ing the broker from procuring a ready, willing, and able purchaser.
This is a valid statement of the law in Illinois as it has been ex-
tracted from all of the cases cited herein.
L. STANTON DOTSON
